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ABSTRACT   In this article I present an argument for ‘embodied ways of knowing’ as an
alternative epistemological strategy, drawing on feminist research and embodied
experience. To present my argument, I begin by considering a number of problematic
dualisms that are central to Western knowledge, such as the separation between mind and
body and between knowledge and experience. In critique of mind/body dualism, feminists
and phenomenologists claimed that Western understandings were based on a profound
ignorance about and fear of the body. Mind/body dualism needed to be challenged and
articulated differently, potentially through valuing and understanding ‘embodiment’. In
critique of the knowledge/experience dualism, feminists and phenomenologists have
suggested that ‘knowing’ could be based on lived experience. From lived experience,
knowledge could be constructed by individuals and communities, rather than being
universal and resulting strictly from rational argument. Research on women’s ways of
knowing and on movement experience provided valuable insights into alternative ways of
knowing.  Just as lived experience and movement experience could be ways of knowing, I
argue that ‘embodied ways of knowing’ could also contribute specifically to knowledge.
The relevance of understanding ‘embodied ways of knowing’ for those involved in
education and movement studies may be the further appreciation, development and
advocacy for the role of movement experience in education.
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I argue that embodied ways of knowing can be an alternative
epistemological strategy. I begin by exploring the research literature in search of
relevant understandings of mind/body, embodiment, knowledge/experience and
knowing in order to articulate an epistemological strategy that resonates with my
own embodied experience.
In an earlier edition of this journal (Barbour, 2000), I reflected on my
experiences as a doctoral student returning to University with a body of
movement and life experience. I commented that I struggled to reconcile my life
experiences with academic knowledge.  Fortunately, I did recognise some of my
own experiences in feminist writings and I was able to locate myself within a
community of knowers for whom ‘knowledge’ could be experiential and
personally relevant. Feminists such as Liz Stanley (1990) argued that ‘knowledge’
needed to be recreated as in-alienated, and grounded in individuals and their
contexts. It seemed that knowledge needed to be reconstructed and multiple
knowledges accepted (Davion, 1994; Jagger & Struhl, 1978; Stanley, 1990). On the
basis of feminist arguments, I saw that exploration and articulation of my
alternative lived experiences was especially important for me in understanding
knowledge.
Through my research, I began to recognise and to critique the dominant
epistemology and the dualisms on which Western knowledge seemed to be built.
Being a dancer had given me an experiential basis from which to question the
dualistic separation of mind and body, and knowledge and experience. I began to
critique the acceptance of reasoning as the only way to ‘knowledge’ and the
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‘somatophobic’ [fear of the body (Grosz, 1994)] privileging of mind and exclusion
of body.  I realised that I needed to become resistant to the practices in my
knowing that worked to keep my mind and body disassociated (Barbour, 2000,
2002; Kellor, 1999).
This article theorises my experiences of embodied ways of knowing and can
be seen as a companion to my earlier narrative writing (Barbour, 2000, 2001a,
2001b, 2002).  I begin by reviewing perspectives on mind/body dualism and the
notion of embodiment before exploring knowledge/experience and the value of
lived experiences.
DUALISMS: MIND/BODY
Arguably, since Plato’s writing the separation of mind and body has been an
important dualistic separation in Western knowledge and culture. This separation
was further theorised by philosopher Rene Descartes (Code, 1991; Grosz, 1994),
and mind privileged over body in his philosophical statement "Cogito ergo sum: I
think therefore I am" (Descartes, 1968, p. 53). Discussion of the body in the history
of Western knowledge was generally limited to the fields of medicine and
pathology and focussed around the corpse (Leder, 1998).  The body in everyday
life seemed to be taken for granted, regarded as unimportant or even ‘absent’
(Leder, 1998), something I personally struggled to understand.
Nevertheless, some theorists did contribute other understandings of the
body. Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964) aimed to locate the
lived body at the centre of individual experience. He argued that it was the body,
not simply the mind, that understood and experienced the world. Mind and body
were interfused or entwined – embodied. Therefore, embodiment was the
existential condition of being in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964).  According
to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the mind/body dualism of Descartes could be replaced
with an understanding of the ‘body-subject’ which did not privilege mental
activity and mind but expressed the relation of a person to his or her world.
Merleau-Ponty’s work was a useful reference for me to begin to theorise my
experiences. For many feminists, his work inspired a focus on the body and
provided a beginning point from which to create an alternative to mind/body
dualism (Bigwood, 1991; Diprose, 1994/1995; Gatens, 1995; Grosz, 1994; Nettleton
& Watson, 1998; Weiss, 1999).  However, Merleau-Ponty was criticised for not
recognising individual difference in his account of the body-subject and because
he continued to use the male body as a model for all people (Grosz, 1994).
Feminist critiques of mind/body dualism and of the body-subject of
Merleau-Ponty aimed to refigure the body at the centre of understandings of
subjectivity and knowing (Grosz, 1994).  Like Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964),
Elizabeth Grosz drew on phenomenology and worked with the notion of the lived
body as opposed to the corpse.  She argued that “philosophy has established itself
on a profound somatophobia” (Grosz, 1994, p. 5) and aimed instead to develop an
alternative figuration of bodily subjectivity. Developing an alternative and
centralised figuration of bodily subjectivity resonated with my desire to
understand mind and body differently.
Grosz began her theorising by commenting that bodies not only had "all the
explanatory power of minds" but they also immediately drew attention to the
question of gender and other markings like race and age (1994, p. vii).  Grosz
continued, “There are always only specific types of body, concrete in their
determinations, with a particular sex, race, and physiognomy” (Grosz, 1994, p. 19).
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From this perspective, the issues of difference were central to understanding
individuals, something I had recognised intuitively and that I connected with
immediately in Grosz’ writing (1994). Difference related to both the corporeal
aspects of an individual and the "manner in which culture marks bodies and
creates specific conditions in which they live and recreate themselves" (Gatens,
1995, p. 71). While neither completely biologically nor socially determined, a body
provided a sense of continuity as the intersection of biological, social and linguistic
understandings (Braidotti, 1994).  As Carol Bigwood described it, "we are always
already situated in an intersubjective (and thereby already cultural),
spatiotemporal, fleshy (and thereby already natural) world before we creatively
adopt a personal position in it" (1991, p. 66).  I appreciated that my body was
continually both in the process of being shaped by social practices and, at the same
time, the means by which I was able to express my resistance to socio-cultural and
bodily norms. Grosz expressed this as, "bodies are not inert; they function
interactively and productively" (1994, p. xi).  Bodies function interactively within
their specific socio-cultural context and also within their geographical
environment. Moira Gatens took a further step and acknowledged the relationship
between environment and individuals, arguing that by "drawing attention to the
context in which bodies move and recreate themselves, we also draw attention to
the complex dialectic between bodies and their environments" (1995, p. 69).
Detailed understandings of bodies in their specific instances revealed both
the effects of cultural construction and of corporeality. However, a person still
remained continually embodied (Albright, 1997), as I experienced.  My body was
culturally constructed to some extent but my embodied options were always
limited by my individual history.  Rosalyn Diprose made this point saying, “what
you can become is limited by the social history of your body” (1994/1995, p. 15).  I
was neither simply culturally produced nor genetically pre-determined. Instead I
am always in a process of becoming, rather than existing as a fixed, genetic object
(Albright, 1997; Grosz, 1994; Weiss, 1999). Feminist understandings of the body
provide a basis for my understandings of embodiment, as I discuss below.
EMBODIMENT
Feminists, myself included, related to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) statement
that every person was uniquely embodied and that embodiment was the
existential condition of being a person (Braidotti, 1994; Grosz, 1994; Weiss, 1999).
Feminist analyses revealed the futility of the attempt to separate the mind from
the body. Quite simply, minds never existed without fleshy bodies. Consequently,
I felt it was more relevant to develop an understanding of embodiment rather than
of the body as distinct from the mind or as a ‘house’ for the mind.
Embodiment has been understood in a number of different ways. Rosi
Bradotti (1994) expressed embodiment as a subject's existence at the point of
overlap between the physical and the cultural. She stated that, "The body, or the
embodiment, of the subject is to be understood as neither a biological or a
sociological category, but rather as a point of overlapping between the physical,
the symbolic, and the sociological" (Braidotti, 1994, p. 4).  In this sense,
‘embodiment’ neither referred exclusively to nor privileged natural/corporeal or
cultural/social understandings.  This was an experientially grounded view of an
embodied person, requiring recognition that a person necessarily was only able to
exist and to know anything as a result of being embodied. I never encountered
another person without a body, or knowledge existing without an embodied
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knower (Flax, 1993).  Everything that I have done myself required a body, from
speaking and thinking and working to eating and sleeping and dancing (Nettleton
& Watson, 1998). To some extent, though, even describing ‘embodiment’ as a point
of overlap required an understanding of separate biological and cultural
categories in some sort of relationship with each other.
From my perspective, ‘embodiment’ incorporated many things as one; a
person’s biological (somatic), intellectual, emotional, bodily, social, gendered,
artistic and spiritual experience, within their cultural and geographical location.   I
want to emphasise now that embodiment is not arbitrary – it does include
recognition of individual diversity in terms of race, gender, sexuality, ability,
history and culture. Communities are made up of many specific embodied
individuals and there is no ‘one’ universal body (Weiss, 1999).  Embodiment thus
indicates a holistic experiencing individual.  I use the term ‘embodiment’
holistically in this sense to avoid the tendency to reinscribe the biological/cultural
distinction, even if trying to theorise a relationship. I offer my understanding of
embodiment as simultaneously and holistically cultural/biological/spiritual/
artistic/intellectual/social/emotional, with recognition of difference in terms of
race/gender/sexuality/ability/history/experience/environment. I move now to
considering alternative ways of understanding knowledge and knowing to
develop my argument for embodied ways of knowing as an alternative
epistemological strategy.
EPISTEMOLOGY / WAYS OF KNOWING
Within Western contexts, ‘knowledge’ was traditionally defined as that
information gained through reason (Code, 1991): Recall Descartes reasoning: “I
think therefore I am” (1968, p. 53). Typically, men were the only legitimate holders
of knowledge, capable of discovering truth and reality through rational method.
Impartiality, detachment and objectivity were the aim of those engaged in the
pursuit of ‘knowledge’ (Goldberger et al., 1996). Obviously, as a feminist I had
great difficulty in accepting this argument, as I had discovered knowledge for
myself, through my own bodily methods and through my experience.
As I noted above, although this Cartesian thinking dominated the Western
world, some theorists had attempted to present non-dualistic understandings that
valued experience.  In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) asserted the
relevance of lived experience in his phenomenological account of human
perception (Grosz, 1994; Nettleton & Watson, 1998). Despite these
phenomenological contributions, experience was not generally considered a valid
or reliable way of knowing or basis from which to establish truth. I was searching
for different perspectives on how we come to know.
Beginning from the premise that much of the work on ways of knowing did
focus only on the experiences of white Western men, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger
and Tarule (1986) undertook extensive interviewing of many women to listen to
their experiences and to understand their epistemological assumptions.  From this
research, the authors were able to articulate five epistemological positions that
characterised the women in their study.  They were careful to point out that the
positions they outlined were not universal, fixed or exhaustive and, also, not
necessarily exclusive to women (Belenky et al., 1986). They also acknowledged
that these positions could not “adequately capture the complexities and
uniqueness of an individual woman’s thought and life” (Belenky et al., 1986, p.
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15). Nevertheless, they offered five epistemological positions of great interest to
my research, which can be summarised as follows:
1. silence – woman experiences herself as mindless and voiceless, dependent on
external authority;
2. received knowledge – woman conceives of herself as capable of receiving
and possibly reproducing knowledge from authority but not of creating her
own;
3. subjective knowledge – woman conceives of truth and knowledge as
personal, private and subjectively known or intuitive;
4. procedural knowledge – woman is learning and applying outside procedures
for getting and communicating knowledge; and
5. constructed knowledge - woman views all knowledge as contextual and
experiences herself as creator of knowledge, valuing both her own and
objective strategies for knowing (Belenky et al., 1986).
Belenky et al. (1986) described the characteristics of each position and commented
that the “quest for self and voice” (p. 133) was a central motivation women
experienced in developing their ways of knowing.  As a result, many feminists
(Goldberger, 1996) have interpreted the epistemological positions as a
developmental scheme, in which an individual might progress from silence
through to constructed knowing, perhaps through the education system. (This
interpretation is not without problems, as Code (1991) discussed.)
The articulation of constructed knowing (the fifth epistemological position)
resonated with my own experience and generally with feminist and postmodern
agendas (Belenky et al., 1986). Belenky et al. commented about the fifth
epistemological position of constructed knowing, that those who attempted to
integrate their own and other voices “had learned the profound lesson that even
the most ordinary human being is engaged in the construction of knowledge”
(1986, p. 133).  Reading this research was pivotal for me in my search for a way to
understand my own ways of knowing. Belenky et al. suggested that individuals
came to constructed knowledge “as an effort to reclaim the self by attempting to
integrate knowledge they felt intuitively was important with knowledge they had
learned from others” (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 143).  Such individuals were
characterised by self-reflectiveness and self-awareness, a high tolerance for
ambiguity, awareness of the inevitability of conflict, attempts to deal with the rich
complexity of life as a whole and the desire to share their knowledge in their own
way.  Belenky et al. suggested that:
Once knowers assume the general relativity of knowledge, that their
frame of reference matters and that they can construct and reconstruct
frames of reference, they feel responsible for examining, questioning,
and developing the systems that they will use for constructing
knowledge. (1986, p. 138-139)
According to Goldberger et al., constructed knowing entailed “a flexibility in
approaches to knowing, an ability to assess the appropriateness and utility of a
particular way of knowing given the moment, situation, cultural and political
imperatives, and relational and ethical ramifications” (1996, p. 356).  As
Goldberger et al. (1996) continued to argue, constructed knowing was flexible and
multiple and, I think, more in line with a postmodern sensibility.  Constructed
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knowers became ‘passionate’ knowers, “weaving their passions and intellectual
life” together (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 141).  Constructed knowing thus provided a
personal and strategic way for women to live their lives with passion.
I found some difficulties in accepting these epistemological positions at face
value. Concerns I shared with other researchers focused on the need to avoid
essentialising knowing, the potential misrepresentation of the multiplicity of
women’s knowing by white feminists, the potential slide into subjective relativism
and the utility of the ways of knowing as a developmental scheme (Code, 1991;
Goldberger et al., 1996).  Some of these concerns were addressed by the authors,
and I think they can be resolved through further attention to the importance of
diversity and to an understanding of the ways of knowing as strategies available,
rather than as positions into which each individual has to fit (Goldberger et al.,
1996).  Goldberger et al. extrapolated, “When context is factored into the study of
knowing, one begins to see the advantages of thinking of five categories as
strategies for knowing (rather than person types)” (1996, p. 362).  It made sense to
me that individuals might choose and use different strategies depending on their
personal contextual requirements.
While I do not wish to generalise from the experiences of the women
interviewed in the research (Belenky et al., 1986) to all people, there is nevertheless
great value in recognising that there might be a variety of epistemological
strategies that may be utilised by individuals, women and men. However, as
Goldberger et al. (1996) pointed out, the focus of this initial research did not
include consideration of and investigation into bodily ways of knowing.
Elizabeth Debold, Deborah Tolman and Lyn Brown (1996), and Nancy
Goldberger (1996), considered some initial issues with bodily ways of knowing.
They were interested in knowledge that was grounded in bodily experiences,
sensations and bodily cues. Although such knowledge was rich and complex,
Goldberger et al. (1996) and Debold et al. (1996) commented that bodily
knowledge should not be mistaken for use of bodily metaphors, like ‘knowing in
my gut’ (Goldberger, 1996).  These bodily metaphors were likely to reflect current
linguistic use “rather than a preferred heuristic, and deeply embodied knowledge
perspective” (Goldberger et al., 1996, p. 355).
Although Debold et al. (1996) argued that knowing might be
reconceptualised through the body, to avoid reinscribing the knowledge/
experience and mind/body dualisms, this step was not taken further in the
women’s ways of knowing research (Belenky et al., 1986). This is the point at
which I creatively moved beyond existing research in my quest to articulate
epistemological strategies.
It seemed to me that bodily knowing could offer a way of knowing available
either as part of the repertoire of constructed knowing strategies and, also, it might
represent a new way of knowing (Goldberger, 1996).  Either way, bodily knowing
was an interesting area for exploration into alternative ways of knowing. In the
next section I consider in more detail understandings of experience developed in
phenomenology, before returning to bodily knowing.
EXPERIENCE
Phenomenologist Iris Young (1980) drew on understandings from Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964) and feminist Simone de Beauvoir (1972) to develop her
understanding of women’s lived bodily experience.  Young (1980) wished to
articulate the specifics of women’s lived movement experience and embodiment,
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something feminists had noted that Merleau-Ponty did not acknowledge (Grosz,
1994).  While Young focussed on movement experiences aimed at achieving
specific tasks, such as throwing a ball, she did outline some basic modalities of
feminine body comportment (1980). Exploring Young’s (1980) modalities I saw the
application to movement in general, and considered the application to dance.  She
argued that a common experience of many Western women involved being both a
subject for herself and object to herself. Women often tended to mediate their
actions by imagining how they appeared as objects to others, at the same time that
they also experienced their actions as intentional subjects (Weiss, 1999; Young,
1980). This experience meant a kind of discontinuity between intention as a subject
undertaking a task and action as an object seen in the world from an external
perspective.  (I was immediately reminded of the paradoxical experiences I had as
a dance student, being both constantly aware of my dancing image in the mirror,
or in the eyes of a choreographer, while attempting to attend myself to the
kinaesthetic experience of moving.) According to Young (1980), feminine bodily
experience was: intentionally inhibited (by perception of inability to achieve the
task undertaken); ambiguously transcendent (by concentrating action in one part
of the body while the rest remained uninvolved); and had a discontinuous unity
(by breaking the connection between intention and action, or between the
possibility of and actual bodily achievement).  In extending her earlier work,
Young (1998) summarised her comments by stating that:
An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living with
the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body,
as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another
subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living
manifestation of action and intention. (1998, p. 270)
Young’s (1980, 1998) work set the precedent for feminist study of women’s
movement experiences separately from men which I found encouraging in my
own search.
Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999) contributed a great deal to
understanding of bodily knowing and the experience of movement as knowledge.
Sheets-Johnstone (1999) developed Merleau-Ponty’s (1962, 1964) and Young’s
(1980) phenomenological work significantly, arguing for the primacy of movement
over the primacy of perception.  She commented that perception results from
movement, and so acknowledged movement as “the originating ground of our
sense-makings” (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 161).  Sheets-Johnstone (1999) argued
that humans learned about themselves and others initially through moving; by
attending to bodily sensations of movement rather than by looking and seeing
what was moving.  Movement was experienced through the kinesthetic sense
rather than through vision.  The kinesthetic sense provided a person with
information about space, time, movement and objects, and their relationship to
these things (Stinson, 1995).  In understanding these aspects through the
kinesthetic sense, a person was able to develop an understanding of what
constituted themselves, and others, and to develop concepts to understand the
world (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999).  In many discussions of the senses, the kinesthetic
sense was left out but, as Sheets-Johnstone (1999) argued, it is fundamental to
knowledge of what we are, to our basic knowledge of the world and our ability to
move knowledgeably in the world.
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Sheets-Johnstone articulated an embodied understanding I had had myself.
She stated that movement was in itself a source of knowledge; movement was the
condition of all forms of perception.  From this perspective, movement experience
was of profound epistemological significance (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999).  At the
foundation of ‘knowledge’ was experience of movement.  Therefore, movement
experience provided individuals with knowledge.
Following from the work of Sheets-Johnstone (1999), I argued that experience
is as valid a method of gaining knowledge as rational knowing. And, therefore, by
studying the movement experiences of individual people, I could learn about
knowledge. I was exhilarated to discover that both Young’s (1980, 1988) and
Sheets-Johnstone’s (1999) work provided validation for investigating lived
movement experiences. Intimately tied to the study of experience is body.
Drawing on my discussion above on embodiment and alternative ways of
knowing, I now suggest embodied ways of knowing as an alternative
epistemological strategy.
EMBODIED WAYS OF KNOWING
Exploration of alternative understandings of the dualisms in dominant Western
knowledge provided a beginning point from which I could research embodied
ways of knowing. I was particularly interested in exploring embodied ways of
knowing in my context of women’s solo contemporary dance making (Barbour,
2001c, 2002).  I was interested in articulating different ways of knowing based on
dancers’ experiences.  I used the phrase ‘embodied ways of knowing’ to indicate
my alternative understandings of ‘knowledge’ and ‘body’.  Embodied ways of
knowing offer an alternative understanding of mind/body dualism, and of the
knowledge/experience dualism (Barbour, 2002).  Just as embodiment
acknowledged diversity as a result of socio-cultural and corporeal aspects and
location, an embodied way of knowing also incorporated individual difference in
knowing (Barbour, 2002).  An embodied strategy for knowing acknowledged
explicitly the importance and influence of who a person is (Barbour, 2002).
Individual differences were not denied in the pursuit of knowledge or the quest
for self but brought to the forefront, and gender differences were a central part of
personal differences.
Developing the work of Belenky et al. (1986), I now theorise a possible sixth
epistemological strategy (Barbour, 2002, 2003).
6. embodied knowledge – person views all knowledge as contextual and
embodied.  The person experiences him/herself as creator of and as
embodying knowledge, valuing her/his own experiential ways of knowing
and reconciling these with other strategies for knowing as s/he lives out
her/his life (Barbour, 2002).
As an individual using an embodied way of knowing, I attempt to understand
knowledge as constructed and, further, as something that is embodied,
experienced and lived.  I attempt to integrate intuitively important knowledge
with knowledge learned from others (Belenky et al., 1986) and with a conscious
awareness of embodying these knowledges. Knowledges could be woven together
with passion, experience and embodied individuality.  For individuals like myself
using an embodied knowledge strategy, living with alternative understandings to
dominant knowledge creates challenges and tensions that will have to be resolved
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personally.  These challenges and tensions will be embodied, experienced and
resolved throughout life.  Resolutions will not come purely through rationalisation
or through intuition but also through embodying and living out the possibilities.
In living out the possibilities, individuals will experience and evaluate knowledge
and sometimes even discard knowledge that they find is not relevant or liveable in
their own lives.
Using an embodied knowing strategy, I theorise that an individual might
creatively adapt personal beliefs and behaviours in order to resolve the tensions
inherent in living in a Western context.  This might well be a lifetime process.
Interrogation of personal daily behaviour and movement, moral and political
commitments, spiritual beliefs, artistic practice, employment choices, relationships
with other individuals, with dominant Western culture and geographical
environment, will need to be thorough and involve a high degree of sensitivity
and scepticism.  In this process, s/he will likely experience tensions (intellectual,
spiritual, artistic, physical and emotional tensions) arising from alternative
perspectives and practices within dominant culture. S/he will need to be articulate
and compassionate in their embodied self-expression.  And s/he will need
extraordinary passion and commitment to live out the solutions!  This, I suggest, is
an embodied way of knowing.
RELEVANCE FOR EDUCATION
I suggest that recognising the importance of movement experience for learners’
understanding in their worlds indicates that greater value should be placed on
movement in education. Whether physical education, health, outdoor recreation,
dance, arts, or environmental studies is the curriculum area, embodied ways of
knowing might be fostered within the curriculum. Movement and focussed
reflection on movement experience can contribute significantly to our knowledge
of ourselves, of each other and of the world around us. For example, improved
kinaesthetic sensing gained through a focus on body awareness in movement
activities might contribute to better understandings of self, such as sensitivity to
personal health and fitness, body alignment and injury prevention, enhanced
ability for changing movement habits/patterns in everyday life and in specialised
movement. Movement experiences can develop better understandings of self in
relation to others, such as improved group coordination in movement and team
work, focussed observation of others moving and relevant feedback in coaching or
creative work, and sensitivity and respect for other’s diverse movement
behaviours and expressions. Movement education may also develop better
understandings of self in relation to the world; for example, awareness and
sensitivity to the impact of environment and culture on self, and self on the
environment and on culture. Whether running, playing the violin, creating dances,
climbing rock faces, performing taiaha, playing competitive basketball, tramping
or learning to breathe fully, movement experience can provide learning that might
be transferred to other movement activities and to other areas of each individual’s
life.
In order to assist the development of embodied ways of knowing,
engagement in a cycle of movement experience, reflection, formulation of
alternative movement/ideas and further experimentation, as suggested by the
experiential learning cycle (Jarvis, 1995; Kolb, 1984) and/or the creative process in
the arts (Balkin, 1990), will assist individuals to reflect on and further value their
movement learning. Recognising embodied ways of knowing and fostering them
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in relevant curriculum areas may lead to greater transference of learning and
knowledge, not just from movement activity to movement activity but throughout
a learner’s life.
SUMMARY
I began this article by commenting on how I struggled to reconcile my lived
experience with academic knowledge (Barbour, 2000, 2001c, 2003).  With reference
to a range of writers who have critiqued and deconstructed Western ‘knowledge’
and dualisms, and who have offered alternative understandings of ‘knowledges’, I
have explored some attempts to understand ways of knowing and embodiment
differently, as documented in research.  My exploration led me to articulate the
possibilities for understanding ways of knowing more broadly than as ‘reasoning’,
reflecting the research of Belenky et al. (1986). In exploring understandings of
mind/body dualism as embodiment, my interests turned to researching embodied
ways of knowing, reflecting my reading of phenomenologists, specifically Iris
Young (1980, 1998) and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999).  With reference to the
valuable work done by Belenky et al. (1986) and Goldberger et al. (1996) on
women’s ways of knowing and to the commentary offered on embodiment, I
suggested what an embodied way of knowing might be (Barbour, 2002). I
commented finally, on the value of recognising and fostering embodied ways of
knowing within educational contexts.
In conclusion, inspired by my own embodied experiences, I drew together an
understanding of constructed knowing strategies with recognition of embodied
difference, and suggested the epistemological strategy of embodied ways of
knowing.  I theorised that embodied ways of knowing are invaluable, particularly
to people focussed on movement and interested in attempting to recreate
themselves throughout their lifetime.
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